Kavli Affiliate: Cheng Peng
| First 5 Authors: Cheng Peng, Houyu Zhou, , ,
| Summary:
In this paper, we consider facility location games with competitors where the
agents are divided into groups and the agents in the same group have
competitive relationships, i.e., the cost of an agent will increase if the
facility is closer to their competitors. We consider three types of
misreporting: misreporting the location only, misreporting the group membership
only, and misreporting both. To minimize the social cost, we propose a
strategyproof mechanism that is optimal when misreporting the location only.
For the other two types of manipulation, we reuse the median mechanism and
achieve tight bounds of 2. To minimize the maximum cost, we design new
strategyproof mechanisms for the first two types of misreporting. We reuse the
leftmost mechanism for misreporting both. All bounds are almost tight.
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